The boom in Japanese horror's international popularity is widely recognized as beginning with Ringu (1998, Japan) (McRoy 91; Harper 7 and 113), the influence of which continues to resonate in remakes of J-horror successes.
Suzuki's novel and its filmic adaptations. The female-male investigative duo found in each film version of Ring was originally envisaged by Suzuki as a male pair composed of a journalist, Asakawa, and his closest friend, Ryuji, who asserts that he is a rapist. Although doubt is cast over his proclamation in the novel's closing stages, Ryuji's declaration shapes his relationship with Asakawa, meaning their bond is tense from the outset. Furthermore, Sadako's sexuality is emphasized in the novel, not least since she may have been raped by her doctor (Nagao) before being murdered. Moreover, Sadako's body is subject to sexual scrutiny since s=he is revealed to be hermaphroditic in the novel.
However, other striking differences arise from the social themes that drive Suzuki's novel. The film versions blame the video and Sadako's malevolence for the deaths that occur. On the surface, it appears that Suzuki's novel is also focused on Sadako as the curse's cause since lead protagonist Asakawa spends the majority of the novel investigating the video's origins and Sadako's history, seeking to discover whether the curse is biological or supernatural. His failure to find a solution indicates that this is not the novel's point. Suzuki's novel is concerned with a figurative social critique. The novel's central conceit is a moral dilemma. After watching the cursed video, one has to copy the tape and show it to someone else, condemning him or her in order to save oneself. The curse itself is not as terrifying as its antidote:
Asakawa's willingness to spread the curse regardless of the potential consequences.
Asakawa envisages his decision to condemn others as leading to a literal apocalypse. He realizes that he ''can save mankind'' (366) by sacrificing his family, but chooses instead to ''let loose on the world a plague wh ich could destroy all mankind'' (365). Although more deaths will ensue as a result of his actions, Asakawa over-compensates in fretting that he will trigger the end of the world. Asakawa's guilt suggests that he cannot evade feeling morally responsible for intentionally dooming others. Yet this f ee l i n g of personal responsibility is vital since it reveals the curse's symbolic function. Moving between objective narration and subjective view-points, from the minutiae of viral infection to the ''apocalyptic'' future consequences, the narrative dramatizes the cost of engaging in systemic violence from a personalized perspective. Asakawa is an allegorical conduit, a figure through which Suzuki can explore the limits of moral obligation and intersubjectivity. R i n g is therefore a parable of social responsibility. Sadako's curse may be a catalyst, but the novel's true targets are the forms of social sickness-rape, murder, self-interest-that privilege the self at the Other's expense. Such behaviors, the narrative proposes, must be transformed or eradicated because they are causes of social instability. Suzuki's novel exposes the duties and potential frailties that underpin interdependency. Ring's populace is dysfunctional precisely because its members lack moral obligation to one another. The novel's allegory points towards the inevitability of a transition from egoism to intersubjectivity. Asakawa's fear of apocalypse represents the impact this evolution would have on the self from the perspective of an egoistic self threatened by that change. The apocalypse motif illustrates the gravity of moral obligation in forming the self. Suzuki dramatizes the pressures of moral obligation and the inexorable transition into full selfhood via his protagonists.
In this sense, Ring's apocalyptic overtones require dissection. Some critics have characterized Japanese horror of the last twenty years as being bleak or nihilistic, particularly because it frequently utilizes apocalyptic imagery (see, for instance, Napier 338 and Berriman 75). However, the use of the term ''apocalyptic'' is problematic in this context. Christopher Sharrett, for example, has expressed a concern over the ''popular misuse of apocalypse not as revelation but doomsday, disaster, the end'' (4). Apocalypse correctly signifies a zero-leveling born out of an unsatisfactory or unstable present.
This transformation need not be negative since the apocalypse-fantasy con-notes the opportunity to rebuild society, to make it better. Ring's populace is constituted by profoundly self-interested individuals whose attitudes are closer to solipsism than intersubjectivity. Ring's apocalypse warns that this state is unsustainable because it damages the self. What is at stake in Asakawa's choice is total destruction, or at least this is how he perceives it. To the reader, the solution is clear. If no one copied the tape, there would be no further harm. The novel thus implies that interdependency is a solution to the malevolence haunting the diegetic public. Sadako is not the real threat: it is self-interest that plagues Ring's populace.
In order to explore these themes and Suzuki's allegorical mode, this article will employ Levinas's ethical philosophy as a point of comparison. The comparison highlights what precisely Suzuki's novel contributes to the philosophy of moral obligation by using the novel form and the apocalypse motif.
Moral Obligation, Intersubjectivity, Levinas
Philosophy has a long history of accounting for how moral codes arise, and the relationships between morality and ''rightness'' or ''wrongness.'' Levinas was interested in the former-how morality arises and defines us-more than the latter. Principally, Levinas proposed that morality underpins self-conception. He contended that moral obligation is a consequence of sociality. In fact, for Levinas, self-conception is contingent on moral obligation to Others. These emphases on morality, sociality, and obligation make Levinas's philosophy particularly apt in considering Suzuki's social critique.
For Levinas, morality arises in conjunction with the individual's development into subjectivity. In his view, we develop selfhood only when we become aware of an Other; when we recognize that other people exist and relate to the world as we do. We initially experience the world as ours. At this stage, we are, as Levinas's early philosophy phrases it, simply egoistic. It is only when we realize that the world is not ours a l o n e that we develop into subjectivity. Two implications follow: first, we come to realize that our experience is preceded by and will be succeeded by the existence of other people. It is this sense of a l l other people, literally present before us or otherwise, that is connoted in capitalizing ''Other.'' Second, we develop into an ''I'' that is differentiated from the Other (''not-I''). Identity is therefore contingent on the Other since we require a ''not-I'' in order to distinguish the ''I. '' 3 In that sense, we are defined as social entities since we can only define identity under the conditions of sociality. Subjectivity is always-already intersubjectivity. Both implications conjoin on the point that we are not sovereign entities. Egoistic experience of the world is a mistake that is corrected by the Other's presence. Moreover, because self is contingent on the Other who experiences the world as ''I'' do and lays at least equal claim to the world, each person is morally obliged to the Other. In fact, because
Others are a priori and a posteriori, the self is always secondary to the Other.
Ethics is synonymous with this ''responsibility-of-one-person-for-the-other'' (Levinas, Outside 42) since subjectivity is contingent on the subject accepting obligations that they did not create. here-and-now experience and ethics is to debunk ontology. Levinas's commitment to self-Other relations means the ''I'' is properly conceived of as an ''I-Thou of dialogue'' with the Other, not an ''I-it,'' an object in the world (Outside 35). Levinas's self is phenomenological; that is, he is focused on consciousness. Suzuki, on the other hand, uses protagonists' experiences to critique social relations.
Ring's critique of social dysfunction employs the self=Other separation at key points to question the nature of social interaction and moral obligation. In the novel's climax, and having failed to find a cure for the video -curse, Ryuji expires. At this moment, it revealed why the video's victims die of pure fright. As he looks at himself, he sees that ''[t]he face in the mirror was none other than his own, a hundred years in the future. Even Ryuji hadn't known it would be so terrifying to meet himself transformed into someone else'' (344).
The exteriorization and transformation of the self into an Other is clearly This horror is rooted in the video-curse that claims Ryuji's life. Ryuji dies because he saw the video but failed to copy it and show it to someone else.
The curse's ''rules'' literalize moral obligation as a dilemma. The self can survive only by choosing to vanquish the Other. In Ryuji's case, because the instructions had been removed from the copy he was exposed to, he did not know how to resolve the curse. His death is nevertheless haunted by the interconnection of self and Other in the imagery Suzuki employs.
Following Ryuji's death, Asakawa realizes what must be done to save himself.
His revelation is equally imbued with the ethos that ''the encounter with the 
The Horror of Social Commitment
R i n g 's social critique is founded on its allegorical protagonist. Asakawa's perspective dominates the novel, yet his morally flawed choices are indicative of much broader problems, all of which are implicated as contributing to the potential ''apocalypse.'' While Levinas dismisses the possibility of solipsistic human existence since subjectivity is contingent on sociality, Suzuki portrays a society constituted by emotionally divorced individuals. Despite their evidently differing approaches, Suzuki shares Levinas's apprehension that this situation is untenable. Suzuki's portrayal of social alienation illustrates the horrifying consequences of people negating their obligation to one another.
The video-curse relies on the individual forsaking Others in favor of his or her personal well-being. Rather than causing people to become asocial, however, this curse arises out of, and therefore is indicative of, social flaws that pre-exist the video. To that end, the novel revels in its populace's self-interested attitudes since they provide much of the text's horror.
Incidental characters such as Kimura, who only makes a brief appearance in the opening, are present to demonstrate that self-interestedness is pervasive. When a motorcyclist collapses onto Kimura's taxi, Kimura is initially only concerned about the scratch on his vehicle, not the rider's spasms (12).
Presenting such flagrant disregard for another's suffering so early in the novel establishes that self-interest is a diegetic social norm.
At its most extreme points, the novel presents interaction as outright disconnection. This is most profoundly manifested in Suzuki's sexual imagery.
For example, the instance of two teen victims ''getting ready to do it'' (41) would dig a hole in the earth and ejaculate into it over and over'' (117).
Ryuji's sexual revelry-which clearly connotes ''fuck the Earth''-is markedly solitary. These powerful sexual images have a significant impact on Ring's tone. They are spread across the novel, meaning comparisons are regularly drawn between social disconnection and the apocalyptic violence it signals. Characterized in this way, obligation is a pressure that becomes increasingly horrific as the novel progresses.
Fet is h a nd Dis -Connect ion

Asakawa's feeling of distance in intimacy recurs in various guises throughout
Ring. In the novel's earliest stages, the city environment is described as an isolating space: ''[n]early a hundred dwellings were crammed into each building, but most of the inhabitants had never even seen the faces of their neighbors. The only proof that people lived here came at night, when windows lit up'' (3). Despite depicting a confluence of individuals, the city's residents are divorced from one another. Their presence is evidenced only by the lights that speak of their existence, but which are also profoundly anonymizing.
Moreover, Asakawa's desire for companionship in this asocial sphere is echoed in the guest-book he reads. As he observes, ''when couples stayed. . . their entries showed it, while when single people stayed, they wrote about how much they wanted a companion'' (90). Like the cityscape lights, these entries are little more than markers of presence that forge an impression of and desire for connectivity between the scribe and the guest -book's
reader. Yet those markers most aptly highlight the distance between the two parties. and tangible'' cost that can be avoided by copying the tape. However, as Asakawa's torment reveals, the tape-copier cannot escape the knowledge that the process will cause another's death. Obligation to the distant Other, the novel proposes, is too great to evade.
The video thus fails as a separating object, as is corroborated by descriptions of the video, which intertwine engaging with the video and bodily incursion. The protagonists theorize that the ''video hadn't been rec orded by a machine. A human being's eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin-all five senses had been used to make this video '' (190) . Watching the video is also charac- 
Becoming Intersubjective
The personal, subjective fear that characters express when watching the tape is externalized and reified in the act of copying the tape and willingly killing an=other. This is Ring's central horror, one that echoes Levinas's vision of intersubjectivity. For Levinas, moral obligation is founded on murder prohibition since the ''I'' is contingent on the Other's a p r i o r i existence ( E n t r e 145).
Entering into (inter)subjectivity involves a shift in how one engages with the world. The egoistic self is consumptive in nature, integrating all it encounters into itself, since self is everything to the egoistic ''I.'' The Other disrupts such consumption because the Other cannot be assimilated into the egoistic self (Levinas, O t h e r w i s e 102). This disturbance is a kind of world-altering violence. Suzuki's description of watching the video is akin to that disruption, involving a negation of the watcher's ''I.'' Asakawa's phenomenal experience of watching the tape entails perceiving events from Sadako's sensorial perspective. The self=Other gap is bridged, but at cost to the watcher who is displaced. Ring's interactions are undergirded by a culmination of such anxieties, ultimately suggesting that entering into intersubjectivity is a violent upheaval. The apocalypse Asakawa predicts in the novel's climax is the logical conclusion to that disturbance. The novel's allegory is focused on this transition.
As Levinas has it, the Other's presence ''breaks the [egoistic] system'' ( E n t r e 38). This breakage is aptly apocalyptic, involving a total remapping of the world for the subject. From the ego's perspective, obligation to the Other is the end of the world since it is the end of perceiving the world as solely belonging to oneself. This realization is a productive rather than purely destructive process. Prior to recognizing the Other's existence, the egoistic self is divorced from the world, being defined by its own ''protestation against totality'' (Levinas, Totality 26). The egoistic self exists in an illusory state of denial, then. The egoistic self may be abnegated in becoming inter-subjective, but this is necessary in order to recreate the ''I'' as a full subject. It is exactly that kind of necessary cataclysm that Ring depicts.
Suzuki's social critique and fetishistic relations portray the populace as clinging to solipsistic, egoistic existence that cannot be sustained. Indeed, the novel's fetishistic motifs demonstrate that even apparently and intentionally distanced engagements are nevertheless inescapably interactive. The egoistic populace cannot resist the apocalypse that is their movement into full (inter)subjectivity. would condemn the Other, the entire populace is brought to a universal
conclusion. An egoistic society must inevitably collapse in on itself.
The allegorical mode is apt for such an exploration since its universalization encapsulates how we each experience the Other. We recognize that others claim the same relation to the world that we experience ourselves, even if we can never know what it is to be someone else. Engaging with the Other requires a kind of empathic projection, an estimation of how we might feel in their place. This is inherent to Levinas's conception of the endlessly negating self that is continually directed toward ''something other than ourselves'' (On Escape 58). Moral universalization, in this view, is rooted in phenomenal experience, which requires that we presume all Others have commensurate experiences of the world. 6 Suzuki uses Asakawa both as allegorical figure and as a point of emotional engagement by portraying his subjective states. This mode is Ring's central strength and Suzuki's principal contribution to these philosophical discussions of selfhood and moral obligation. Ring's allegory is unique because it dramatizes how the transformation of the egoistic self into intersubjectivity feels for the ''I'' undergoing that change. Ring shares many of Levinas's philosophical aims, yet Levinas brushes over the initial stage, focusing his attention not on the egoistic self but on the intersubjective self and its relation to the Other. Levinas is concerned with outward movement, away from the self. He concentrates on the Other, on the conditions that pre-exist the subject ''before acting, before feelings,'' perceiving emotion as that which ''shuts us up within ourselves'' (Entre 36, 38). Those emotions point away from the self for Levinas. Suzuki utilizes inward, emotional experience to explore the violent upheaval of becoming a subject. Ring's horror emphases the flux and how that feels and thus is emotionally engaging in a way Levinas's philosophy cannot be.
Suzuki's other significant contribution to these debates stems from the relationship between allegory and social critique in Ring. Suzuki's novel uses allegory to underline that moral obligation is integral to selfhood but uses the horror idiom to warn that a populace motivated by self-interest is one that teeters on the brink of collapse. That underlying flaw is the ''Devil'' that Ryuji warns will reappear ''in a different guise'' as long as humans exist (366, 276).
The novel's apocalypse presents this looming disaster as a situation for which everyone is personally responsible.
In conclusion, then, Ring does not write off humanity. It points out the dangers of self-interest to underscore how necessary it is to remain conscious of our moral obligation to others. The novel's ending predicts rather than depicts devastation, meaning that the ''apocalypse'' is a stage in a process of becoming: that is, becoming a full subject. Ring's surface tone feels fatalistic and the central conceit means the causal path appears to be clearly delimited: if one watches video, one dies. However, the novel's social critique is interested in the ''uncertain future'' (366) of communal relations.
Asakawa's uncertainty over the future and Ring's moral denouement leave the reader with a series of questions regarding selfhood, moral responsibility, and the internalization of social obligation. The true horror of Suzuki's story is not the ghost or the video: it is ourselves.
N o t es
